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MINUTES OF IAC MEETING - 31 MARCH 1950

1. This meeting was called by the DCI on the request of Mr. Armstrong to discuss the intelligence support of the Voice of America.

I. THE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA

2. The basis for discussion of this subject was Mr. Armstrong's memorandum of 24 March 1950, with enclosures dealing with the problem of Soviet jamming of the Voice of America in some detail.

3. THE DCI opened the meeting, mentioned its purpose, and asked Mr. Armstrong to explain his wishes.

4. MR. ARMSTRONG began by describing the Voice of America as one of the most effective cold war weapons available to us, but went on to express his concern lest it be rendered completely useless by Soviet jamming. This jamming was so effective that we could not expect to force the Voice through without a major effort and a considerable expenditure of funds. The decision whether such a major effort was to be undertaken must be made by the President on the advice of the National Security Council, and the State Department was preparing to present the problem for consideration. It would take several months, however, to obtain such a decision, and in the meantime the country was not willing to wait. Some interim measures must, therefore, be taken to improve the situation as best we might. For this reason he requested that activities of CIA and the IAC agencies be stepped up in support of the Voice of America as outlined in his memorandum of 24 March 1950. He summarized the proposals in his memorandum as asking: (1) for CIA to draw together all available information, and (2) for the IAC to designate an ad hoc committee to recommend methods for the intelligence support of the Voice for the interim period, the Committee to report in one month.

5. Discussion following Mr. Armstrong's statement of his proposal brought out that other members of the IAC felt that the intelligence support

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SECRET

- 2 -

of the Voice of America was almost purely a problem for special intelligence.

6. MR. ARMSTRONG disagreed with the consensus of opinion, stating that he felt that other types of intelligence activity could also produce applicable information.

7. THE DCI brought out that we already had a committee (the Electronics Committee of the SIC) which could consider this problem, taking into account all possible types of support. He went on to say that he understood, in any event, that there were only certain ways to approach the problem of overcoming jamming, no matter what information were collected on the subject. In fact, no amount of available information would have much bearing on the matter.

8. At this point ADMIRAL STEVENS made a number of observations with regard to the vulnerability of the people of the USSR to psychological warfare. He brought out that we should not accept defeat in attempting to reach the Russian people until the problem of overcoming Soviet jamming were investigated by the best scientific talent.

9. MR. ARMSTRONG agreed with Admiral Stevens but said that the examination of the problem by top scientists was a matter for the President to decide. Meanwhile he wished the interim situation to be dealt with.

10. At this point [REDACTED] brought out his opinion that the penetration of hostile jamming was almost completely a matter for engineering consideration and that intelligence could do little in the way of assistance. The information desired by State concerning Soviet jamming was to a great extent impossible to obtain without having men on the ground in innumerable places inside the USSR. His remarks stimulated considerable discussion, which was inconclusive.

11. THE DCI stated that perhaps something would be accomplished by restating previous requirements on the U. S. missions abroad for furnishing information concerning reception of the Voice of America.

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- 3 -

12. GENERAL CABELL said that the problem resolved itself into two phases as far as he was concerned: (1) the formulation of the Voice of America requirements for intelligence support, and (2) how to meet these requirements. In reply to Mr. Armstrong's statement that the requirements were already set forth in his memorandum of 24 March 1950, General Cabell stated that he felt these requirements were not sufficiently specific.

13. THE DCI repeated his proposal that the Electronics Committee of the SIC be asked to consider the problem. He asked when the IAC members would like to have this Committee meet on the subject.

14. Action: It was decided that the Electronics Committee would meet on 5 April 1950 at CIA to examine the problem of intelligence support of the Voice of America on the basis of Mr. Armstrong's memorandum of 24 March 1950.

II. POLICY CONCERNING SOVIET AND SATELLITE SERVICE ATTACHES IN THE U. S.

15. THE DCI stated that he had one more item: the treatment to be accorded Soviet and Satellite Service Attaches in this country. General Cabell had proposed that the subject be considered by the IAC. The DCI's reply was that this was a matter almost completely for the Departments of State and Defense. Since General Cabell still felt, however, that the DCI should make some recommendations in this connection, he was willing to form an ad hoc committee to make a preliminary study for the IAC. If agreeable to all, this ad hoc committee would meet for the first time at 1400 Wednesday, 12 April 1950 in the DCI's Conference Room under the Chairmanship of [REDACTED]

16. Action: All members of the IAC agreed to furnish representatives for the ad hoc committee as proposed by the DCI.

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